Pinocchio becomes a real boy when his body is entirely smooth. Organic form is thus, among other things, an erasure of articulation. This may be why Western cultures are intolerant of any lines on the body-any wrinkles or signs of experience-especially in a love object.
--Barbara Johnson, Persons and Things
Prologue: Montaigne's Face
W H A T , I N T I M E , M A K E S U P A F A C E ?
Nearly two-thirds of Michel de Montaigne's late essay ''Of Physiognomy'' (1585-88) passes without mention of the correspondence between a facial feature and the personal, let alone racial or national, character of the one who wears it. The very physical heading instead fastens together matters we might label sociohistorical, medical, and rhetorical: local outbreaks of plague and of the ongoing religious civil wars, petty cruelties among neighbors, the virtues of Socratic ''simplicity'' of expression, and a series of luxuriantly self-reflexive accounts of piecing together the text at hand as a garment of borrowed flowers. In fact it is here, describing his ''treatise on physiognomy'' as a ''bundle of others' flowers [un amas de fleurs estrangers]'' that Montaigne first uses the word ''physiognomy'' at all. 1 Contrary to later modern understandings of corporeality, the essay's relationship to its title suggests that the task of interpreting the features of a physical body or face (physio þ gnomen) discloses not a b s t r a c t This essay explores Percy Shelley's The Triumph of Life as a strategic revival of Lucretian poetic science: a materialism fit to connect the epochal, romantic interest in biological life to the period's pressing new sense of its own historicity. Shelley mobilizes Lucretian natural simulacra to show how personal bodies produce and integrate passages of historical time, exercising a poetics of transience that resists the triumphalism characteristic of both historiography and vitalist biology in the post-Waterloo period. Representing aging faces as mutable registers of the ''living storm'' of a post-Napoleonic interval, The Triumph depicts the face-giving trope of prosopopoeia as the unintended work of multitudes-demonstrating a nineteenth-century possibility of thinking biological, historical, and rhetorical materialisms together. Representations 128. Fall 2014 © The Regents of the University of California. ISSN 0734-6018, electronic ISSN 1533-855X, pages 60-92. All rights reserved. Direct requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content to the University of California Press at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintinfo.asp. DOI: 10.1525/rep.2014.128.3. 60. psychological character or national type, but a local and contingent history: the complex sequence of incidents, affects, and influences (political, medical, and literary) that shape a personal face over the course of a shared historical interval. The essay makes one wonder not only what bundle of strangers' words the ''I'' animates in this form of life writing but also whether the physical body we now call ''biological'' is not similarly animated, whether its living morphology might be conceived as a more fortuitous bundle of others' ''flowers'' and ''troubles.' ' The first overt aim of Montaigne's essay-as of its echoes in a certain familiar strain of romantic aesthetics-is to extol the virtue of ''unadorned,'' ''natural'' expression, a ''childlike'' purity of self-presentation that Montaigne (dubiously) attributes to Socrates. Yet from Socrates's incongruously unpleasant face onward, the problem of interpreting faces in the essay, the problem ''Of Physiognomy,'' instead propels lush digressions on local minutiae and links them frankly with the problem of growing old. For that is what Montaigne is doing in these late essays: gently mocking-and clearly copiously relishing-the ''folly'' of ''putting one's decrepitude in print. '' 2 The essay allies senescence with ''yielding'' oneself, prolifically, to the impress of ''the age'' and the burden of ''borrowed ornaments'': ''I load myself [je m'en charge] with them more and more heavily every day beyond my intention and my original form, following the fancy of the age and the exhortation of others. '' 3 The collective experience of the civil wars is described similarly, as a ''load'': ''a mighty load [charge] of our troubles [nos troubles] settled down for several months with all its weight right on me. '' 4 For Montaigne, then, physiognomy concerns the transfigurative burden [charge] ''of the age'' upon the small figure of an embodied self: over time, he writes, a highly specific series of impacts, influences, and incorporations transform what is mine-''my intention and my original form''-into a decadent record of diverse transactions and borrowings. In this sense, an aging person is increasingly ''of the age. ' ' And yet to age in this way has required a stream of minutiae so particular in their sequence and so local in their place-''A thousand different kinds of troubles assailed me in single file,'' writes Montaigne-that to be so shaped is to become not typical, but irreproducible, to acquire a unique face. 5 The corporeality of old age takes extremely particular and collective form in Montaigne. Senescing into an increasingly ''borrowed'' self, the essayist claims to write from a position of generous and nontraumatic alienation: ''opulently,'' and in ''ignorance.'' weathered and composite physiognomy serves as its emblem because those earlier modern wrinkles knit together biological and historical ages much as the wrinkled faces in Shelley's The Triumph of Life (1822) can be seen to do. In Shelley's last, long, fragmentary poem, faces age under the pressure of a markedly historical atmosphere, one in which a belated image of Napoléon in chains can physically transfigure a person's face: ''I felt my cheek / Alter to see the great form pass away' ' (224-25) . The poem ends picturing senescent bodies as the unintended work of multitudes, each wrinkle attesting, in a way that is not legible like a text and not evident in the texts of monumental history, to the attenuated impacts of a shared historical present.
The Triumph of Life was made famous, in late twentieth-century criticism, for the way its ''disfigured'' faces allegorized the verbal and material violence inherent in figuration as a function of reparative reading. In this article, however, I attempt to show how The Triumph's last lines pointedly cease to construe figuration as a principally verbal or cognitive process at all. 8 The neglected ''new Vision'' (434) with which Shelley's poem breaks off instead urges readers to review the scene of life that The Triumph of Life has been showing all along, but this time under changed philosophical and poetic premises about the relation between life, matter, and trope.
9 For Shelley summons a very old poetic science to achieve his ''new Vision,'' pointedly depositing the poem's speakers and its readers in the midst of a closely adapted scene from Lucretius's classical materialist epic, De rerum natura (c. 55 BCE). 10 This ancient atomist scene depicts the sensation of ''Vision'' itself as a figurative effect of material dissolution.
Though the allusion to De rerum natura is widely acknowledged, its stakes have not been grasped in their specificity and ramifications, for what Shelley's poem expressly retrieves is Lucretius's (now) astonishing poetics of sensation. 11 In the passages Shelley repurposes from De rerum natura, beings transpire into tropes, collectively producing, at once, temporal succession and the order of the visible. 12 This possibility, I argue, authorizes The Triumph's weathered faces to confront us with their extraordinary concurrence of vital, rhetorical, and historical eventfulness-and needs to be understood for the challenge it posed to then-triumphal means of representing biological, poetic, and historical form. Taking Shelley's gesture in The Triumph of Life as emblematic of the stakes and motives of Lucretius's afterlife in romantic poetry and science, I argue in this essay that Lucretian materialism offered romantic-era thinkers a logic, lexicon, and imaginarya poetics-fit to connect the epochal epistemic problem of biological life to the period's pressing new sense of its own historicity.
Romantic-era aesthetics and life sciences are frequently said to converge in the shared ideal of vitally autonomous organic form: ''I define life as the principle of individuation,'' wrote Samuel Taylor Coleridge in 1816, ''the power which unites a given all into a whole that is presupposed by its parts.'' 13 Yet against such biological and formal investments, Shelley's fragmentary poem about ''Life'' ends scrutinizing the ''living air'' between bodies, as though life's science and its poetry ought to register less the self-forming power of organic forms than the transfigurative touch of an atmosphere they both generate and endure. The Lucretian poetics of transience enable Shelley to open the biological and aesthetic ideal of ''organic form'' to historical figuration, without thereby alleging the unilaterally discursive shaping of the matter of natural life. In this, Shelley's ''new Vision'' demonstrates a nineteenth-century possibility of exercising materialisms we would now distinguish as natural, historical, and linguistic together.
This possibility hinged on a technical feature of Lucretian materialism that earlier modern readers were better motivated than we have been to grasp. Among the welter of vitalist, materialist, hylozoist, Spinozist, and animist ontologies familiar to eighteenth-and nineteenth-century thinking-and, again, to us, somewhat lumpenly, by way of the ''new'' materialisms-Lucretius's epic poetic physics offered something unique.
14 De rerum natura cast figuration as the inalienable activity and passion of matter in general, without thereby casting matter as either alive or a product of its verbal representation. 15 As Shelley's Triumph of Life demonstrates, the first caveat has rare and critical consequences for philosophies of life, while the second, I will argue, generatively baffles romanticists' most refined strategies of materialist and rhetorical reading.
As Shelley urges us to see, by grounding figuration in the stuff and structure of the material universe, human and inhuman, verbal and nonverbal alike, De rerum natura purveys its poetry as a privileged mode of scientific perception and expression: a knowledgeable practice whose tropic movements keep it closer to, not further from, the physical nature of things. A materialism that, in Natania Meeker's perfect formulation, ''does not find its own origins in the split between representation and things-in-themselves,'' could afford poetry a strong claim to social, material, and natural realities at a nineteenth-century moment when disciplinary norms were beginning to render that claim incredible. 16 To the extent that three technical, hard-to-reconcile senses of ''matter'' compete in contemporary materialist criticism-the deconstructive materiality of the letter, the Marxian matter of history, and, more recently, the ''vibrant'' and polymorphous materials that ''new'' materialists retrieve from the history of philosophy and modern science studies-De rerum natura still has something to offer. Channeling, for a moment, the broad-brush brilliance of Bruno Latour's anthropology of Western modernity, Lucretian materialist poetics have proven their irrepressible aptitude for representing things as they are-''simultaneously real, like nature, narrated, like discourse, and collective, like society''-against the modern partitions of knowledge that render these Growing Old Together: Lucretian Materialism in Shelley's ''Poetry of Life'' dimensions mutually unrepresentable. 17 Where each of the more recent techniques of materialist criticism has aimed to demystify, undo, or break with the others, neo-Lucretian ''matter'' instead names the will to secure between them, as between every entity and process, a minimal substance of relation and susceptibility. From Montaigne to Shelley and Louis Althusser, this materialism has offered its poetic science of tiny simple elements and complex composite figures as fit means to articulate the relation between apparently incompatible modes and scales of analysis, validating figuration as the material relay between them. ''Materialist figuration'' of the kind Monique Allewaert luminously advances, is still needful, then-not least because it refuses to concede the real to the genres that presently monopolize its representation. 18 ''Vitally metaphorical'' in the sense Shelley put forward in the ''Defence of Poetry,'' in his hands Lucretius's ancient poetic materialism ''marks the before unapprehended relations of things, and perpetuates their apprehension.'' 19 The formulation activates, at once, the registers of natural life, metaphoric transfer, and historical relation at issue here and in the pages that follow.
I next draw out the significance of Shelley's neo-Lucretian gesture across the several contemporary domains with which it communicated. First, that of the young life sciences and the philosophical vitalism that controlled both sides of the early-century debate in London over life's principle and cause. Second, that of historiography and what Kevis Goodman and James Chandler have diagnosed as the pressing romantic-era problem of how to represent historical ''contemporaneity'' as heterogeneous and unsettled ''history in solution. '' 20 Third, that of poetry-which Shelley thought needed a ''Defence'' in 1820-within a disciplinary culture that increasingly expected poetic language to express the immaterial experience of subjects, and nonpoetic scientific prose to describe the material being of things. 21 The Triumph of Life's Lucretian poetics of transience, I argue, offer an alternative to the valorization of autonomy and power audible in both post-Waterloo historiography and the vitalist, biological, and aesthetic discourse of ''organic form.'' Returned to these contexts, Shelley's poem shows how Lucretius's poetic science-this figural materialism that does not know, need, or support the deepening division of labor between literary and scientific cultures in general, or the categorical uniqueness of ''biology'' in particular-is of romantic and ongoing use for its countercultural capacity to think livable form in conjunction with material processes that are instead historical and rhetorical.
Shelley, Wrinkled
The posthumously published Triumph of Life consists of a series of nested visions narrated in recursive terza rima by a dreaming lyric speaker and his dream-guide, a very wrinkled person who self-identifies as ''what was once Rousseau.'' The visions unfold various perspectives on a ''shape'' called ''Life,'' who drives a triumphal chariot at madcap speed, towing a ''captive multitude'' of historical personages in chains. These include ''Kant,'' ''Voltaire,'' ''Frederic'' (the Great, of Prussia), ''Catherine'' (the Great, of Russia), ''Leopold'' (II, of the Holy Roman Empire), ''Napoleon,'' ''Caesar,'' ''Constantine,'' ''Plato,'' and ''Bacon,'' among others, in a cast weighted slightly toward the recent history of ''the times that were / And scarce have ceased to be'' (180, 178, 233-34). As M. H. Abrams once wittily summarized, ''Rousseau'' interprets this procession of ''great'' and ''unforgotten'' (208-9) names and faces as ordered according ''to the degree of their failure''-the degree to which they succumbed to ''those material and sensual conditions of everyday existence which solicit, depress, and corrupt the aspiring human spirit.'' 22 Indeed, much of the first part of the speakers' dialogue, and many critical interpretations of the poem, concern whether it is possible to ''forbear / To join the dance'' of mortal life unfolding before them, as a ''sacred few'' spirits seem to have done: whether it is possible to shun the sensuous life of the decaying body, which life ''Rousseau'' regrets as a ''Stain'' that his spirit ''still disdains to wear'' (188-89, 205). The interlocutors repeatedly and famously ask after the problem of bodily life in terms of the quintessential demands of autobiography and biology: ''Shew whence I came, and where I am, and why'' and ''Then, what is Life?'' (398, 544). The poem, I will argue, experiments in answering these demands with the history of the ''Stain,'' as if life's logic and narrative depended upon it.
Though romanticists understand Shelley as an acute theorist of history, even epitomizing ''the age of 'the Spirit of the Age,''' this is rarely by way of the mortal, wrinkled, terrestrial corporeality that preoccupies The Triumph of Life. 23 Yet, as already intimated, Paul de Man's ''Shelley Disfigured'' (1979) made The Triumph of Life a privileged test case for the rhetorical dimension of face change and exchange-the trope of prosopopeia-in romantic writing and its critical reconstructions. 24 De Man took the fragmentary, ''mutilated'' Triumph-and the ''disfigured'' faces of its personages-as an allegory for the ''sheer,'' ''unrelated,'' ''violent power'' at work in every act of reading (116). Readings establish historical relation, cognitive meaning, and aesthetic pleasure by way of an ''endless prosopopoeia,'' de Man argued, a giving of face (French: figure) to the dead that cannot but disfigure and efface even as it animates and monumentalizes (122). For each reparative act of ''cognition and figuration'' must violently instantiate the originary ''madness of words''-the ''positing power'' of ''language considered by and in itself,'' a ''random'' power indiscriminately destructive of all relation, sense, and sequence (116, 122).
De Man's lasting provocation has been to suggest that it is here, in registering through disfigurement a power radically alien to life, relation, and sense, that The Triumph comes closest to history, to the materiality of ''actual events, called 'Life' in Shelley's poem'' (120). De Man mimes the gesture by invoking Shelley's ''mutilated corpse'' to exemplify the matter of historical eventfulness, pointing out that Shelley's death at sea in 1822 left the poem and the poet correspondingly ''defaced'' (120). 25 Since de Man, the relation of Shelley's poetics to material history has elicited romanticists' finest elaborations of a negative aesthetic radicalism that takes de Man, with Immanuel Kant and Theodor Adorno, as its touchstones and casts ''the materiality of actual history'' as a paradoxical precipitate of the lyric negation of contemporary life. On this view, lyric registers ''previously obscured aspects of the social''-the writer's and the reader's respective presents-precisely in so far as it ''eschews the relation of self to society as explicit theme,'' severing its contacts with the age. 26 Sheer negation thus defines this version of historicopoetic ''material'': Forrest Pyle's exemplary reading makes cinders and ash Shelley's quintessential materials-charred minima that mark the site where a remarkable array of illusions (of historical insight, ethical choice, sensuous facticity, verbal intelligibility, revolutionary efficacy, theological redemption) go up in smoke, on contact with the ''vacating radical or the aesthetic itself. '' 27 There is ample evidence for such negative poetic materialism in The Triumph of Life: interpreters have focused on the ''shape all light,'' de Man's ''model of figuration in general,'' whose (metrical) feet ruthlessly trample ''the gazer's mind'' to ''dust'' (Triumph, 352, 386, 388; ''Shelley Disfigured,'' 115). But as I began by stressing, a ''new Vision'' follows in The Triumph of Life, one that atomizes the aesthetically absolute ''shape all light'' into ''a thousand unimagined shapes'' (491). These shapes, ''like atomies that dance / Within a sunbeam'' (446-47), signal an emphatic switch to an alternative, neoLucretian model of sensation and figuration in The Triumph of Life, one with dramatically different consequences for the relation between the matter of mortality, history, and trope. 28 In De rerum natura dancing dust motes in a sunbeam are a privileged figure for the chance encounters and entanglements among atoms that, according to the poem's natural philosophy, first produced the structures of the universe and continue to propel its incessant change. 29 Lucretius explains that the little ricocheting dust motes are ''an image and similitude'' (simulacrum et imago) of ''the first-beginnings of things . . . ever tossed about in the great void,'' ''many minute particles mingling in many ways'' (2.112; 1.121-22, 116). But this ''simulacrum'' leads Lucretius to ask his auditor to contemplate the sunbeam's turmoil for another reason: the motes are a telling instance of the ongoing atomic commotion that they image; subsensible atomic interactions are compounding to produce these dusty dances barely big enough to see.
The motes' double status as image and instance of their own imperceptible constitution goes to the heart of a Lucretian physics of figuration that is of sustained importance to The Triumph of Life. In De rerum natura, simulacra are noticed, not made: the simulacrum et imago at issue, says Lucretius, is ''always moving and present before our eyes [ante oculos semper nobis versatur et instat]'' (2.113). The poet's task is less to impress the reader with the creations of his expressive consciousness than to register the ''new thing'' that is already ''striving ardently to fall upon your ears . . . and a new aspect of things to show itself [tibi vementer nova res molitur ad auris / accidere et nova se species ostendere rerum]'' (2.1024-25). As we will continue to see, things (res) offer themselves up to perception in tropes, ''ostending'' their reality into the senses of an attentive observer. Yet often ''like dust clinging to the body,'' like ''the impact of a mist by night, or a spider's gossamer threads,'' such forms of nonhuman disclosure ''are so exceedingly light that they . . . find it a heavy task to fall'' (3.382-83, 387-88). De rerum natura is the poetry that works to sensitize its readers to the subtle impact of what often passes unfelt: to ''arrest,'' as Shelley would say, ''the vanishing apparitions which haunt the interlunations of life.'' 30 Not only a figure for atomic motion, then, the dancing motes are a figure for the reality of figures, here credited as conduits between sensuous perception and realities of otherwise inaccessible scale.
The famously ''disfigured'' figure of ''Rousseau'' is in fact exemplary of Lucretian prosopopeia in this regard. In a way so obvious as to have gone unnoticed, ''Rousseau'' is not a figure animated and cut down, faced and effaced, all at once in Shelley's poem. The ''grim Feature'' (190) with whom The Triumph's dreaming poet-speaker converses might be less ''mutilated'' by the hermeneutic rush ''to reconstruct, to identify, to complete'' (''Shelly Disfigured,'' 94) than simply decomposed: ''what was once Rousseau'' speaks while becoming landscape, by way of a prosopopoeia so slight, so incomplete that it amounts at first only to ''strange distortion'' and leaves the face it draws mistakable for ''root,'' ''grass,'' and ''hill side'' (204, 183, 182, 185, 183). ''What was once Rousseau'' is mistakable, that is, for ''what was once Rousseau'' in a more literal sense at the time of Shelley's writing: a body more than forty years buried. Against the (admittedly wayward) norms of lyric apostrophe, the speaking ''I'' does not address, but is addressed by this feature of the landscape, surprised when ''what I thought was an old root'' begins to speak to him. This might be a ruse of lyric selfproduction, were it not a touch funny: taken aback, the interrupted speaker expends his own apostrophic powers in a little parenthetical gasp of surprise-(''O Heaven have mercy . . . !)'' (181)-and begins to discern a ''grim Feature'' still eminently continuous with the surrounding landscape. 31 This face is presented less as the work of an animating, lyric ''I'' upon an inert object than as a figure capable of obtruding itself into the subject's Growing Old Together: Lucretian Materialism in Shelley's ''Poetry of Life'' reverie, indeed, of startling that dreaming subject into noticing the action of his surround. We might say that here lyric poesis is startled by a kind of poetry ''strange'' to it, a didactic kind that credits the tropic force and susceptibility of things. The speaker collaborates in this low-level animation by calling his unexpected interlocutor a ''grim Feature,'' a mere part of a face, leaving intact its resonances with inhuman and inanimate orders: textually, the ''grim Feature'' is a Milton citation; minerally, a feature of a landscape. 32 Historically, as Orrin Wang has brilliantly argued, the question of ''what was once Rousseau'' was synecdoche for the recent history of Europe, from radical enlightenment to Napoléon's fall, a shorthand question ''people asked in order to interrogate the era they inhabited.'' 33 Here this historical question cannot fully extricate itself from a ''hill side,'' or from Paradise Lost, participating instead in a subtle, partial, multilateral prosopopeia that eventually leads the interlocutors into a lengthy exposition of Lucretian figural corporeality. But to understand this corporeality as dissent, we need to examine how romantic-era bodies were expected to take life and shape.
Life Triumphant
Shelley's The Triumph of Life opens with a scene that studiously conflates biological and imperial senses of ''power,'' a vision in which Life's process is pictured as the triumphal procession celebrating ''some great conqueror's advance . . . the true similitude / Of a triumphal pageant'' (112, 117-18). But this image is not, as has frequently been assumed, a condemnation of life as such. Life ''as such'' was a matter of tense public debate in early nineteenth-century England: as L. S. Jacyna showed nearly three decades ago, both medical and general publics viewed rival physiological accounts of ''life'' as supporting competing systems of moral, political, and theological order. 34 The Shelleys' own physician, William Lawrence, was a principal protagonist in a public debate over the nature of physiological ''vitality'' that had recently transfixed and scandalized broad segments of the English public, even eliciting retaliation from state authorities. 35 ''Life'' was a topic of ideologically freighted dispute, and Shelley's The Triumph of Life can be understood as dissenting from a particular, presently triumphant, and rhetorically triumphalist way of researching and speaking about it: the vitalist presumption that the question worth asking about living beings concerned the ''power'' that distinguished them categorically from other (frequently ''material'') beings. The poem subverts, in particular, the organicist variety of vitalism-the ideal of living form as a power of autonomous self-organization-in which romantic biology and aesthetics are frequently said to converge. The ''triumphal pageant'' of life in the poem's first scene is a visual pun on the medical and imperial senses of ''power,'' inviting readers to consider how the vitalist approach to life might collaborate with power in more overtly historical and political modalities. Taking place at the conjunction between rhetoric and biopolitics that Sara Guyer has termed ''biopoetics,'' The Triumph caricatures one biopoetical mode, and offers up another. 36 In fact, in an early intimation of the thesis made axiomatic by Michel Foucault, Georges Canguilhem, and François Jacob in the twentieth century, the very title of Shelley's poem points to the pancultural ''triumph'' of a newly sovereign concept-''Life''-in reconfiguring the early nineteenthcentury epistemic order of disciplines and things. ''Life'' had not always seemed a distinctive problem, ''an explanatory challenge or . . . scandal,'' meriting its own experimental and philosophical research program. 37 But if, for some (disputed) period living beings resided inconspicuously on the continuum of natural beings in general, by the late eighteenth century, the difference between organic and inorganic, living and nonliving, had become a salient, ontological distinction for much new medical and philosophical thinking.
In his influential treatise On the Formative Drive (Über den Bildungstrieb, 1781), German savant J. F. Blumenbach proclaimed that ''one cannot be more inwardly convinced of something than I am of the powerful gulf that nature has fixed between the organized and inorganic creatures.'' 38 Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment gave Blumenbach's catching phrase Bildungstrieb its tentative but influential imprimatur. Natural and experimental philosophy was indeed delineating a specific type of natural being for its object: the ''organized and self-organizing being.'' The organism's ''selfpropagating formative power,'' Kant argued, was ''not analogous with any causality we know.'' 39 Mere material bodies were obedient to ''blind mechanism'' and ''in the highest degree contingent''; 40 the organic being presents instead as both ''cause and effect of itself,'' Kant argued, and merits investigation under the rubric of its special teleological insularity. 41 Enthusiastically adopted in Coleridge's 1812-13 lectures on Shakespeare as a criterion of poetry's ''living power,'' the ideal of autotelic organic form has been criticized as the very condition of possibility for romantic ideological resilience: ''Only organically,'' writes Helmut Mü ller-Sievers, ''can the interminable chain of causes and effects be bent back onto its own origin, and only as organic can a discourse claim to contain all the reasons for its own existence.'' 42 More recently, Denise Gigante has celebrated an aspiration toward organic form as the hallmark of ''romanticism as a shared intellectual project'': ''Once life was viewed vitalistically as power,'' she argues, ''science and aesthetics confronted the same formal problems.'' 43 New studies are brilliantly variegating the spectrum of romantic vitalisms, Growing Old Together: Lucretian Materialism in Shelley's ''Poetry of Life'' but it is worth asking whether all approaches to the problem transpire within vitalist limits, however openly and experimentally defined. 44 When the ''vital principle'' came to engrossing public debate between Lawrence and John Abernethy in London in the teens, both sides of this dispute-including what the press designated as its ''materialist'' left, in the person of Lawrence-shared a vitalist orientation in the terms glossed at the outset of this section. 45 Shelley's poem expressed an intuition that this rhetoric of vital power-whether that power was cast in Abernethy's terms, as a transcendent ''superadded principle,'' or in Lawrence's, as a power immanent in organization-risked collaboration with power of the imperial kind. This was not an abstract risk in the early 1820s.
Lawrence's controversial Lectures on Physiology, Zoology, and the Natural History of Man (1819) graphically clarify the moral and political eventualities of vitalist organicism. Ranking men in ''fixed varieties'' according to their degree of ''organization,'' Lawrence's science discovered, even in fetuses, the ''National Characters'' of his human specimens. 46 In light of the ''retreating forehead and depressed vertex of the dark varieties of man,'' Lawrence suggested, abolitionists ought to temper their expectations to the ''less perfect'' organization of enslaved peoples. Lawrence's physiognomic physiology scandalized even the conservative Quarterly Review, which dryly editorialized that a ''slave-driver in the West Indies'' might use Lawrence's book to soothe his ''qualms of conscience.'' 47 More subtle, and more subtly contested in Shelley's Triumph, is Lawrence's equation of degree of life with degree of organization in the Lectures: ''Just in the same proportion as organization is reduced, life is reduced; exactly as the organic parts are diminished in number and simplified, the vital phenomena become fewer and more simple'' (95). As the Quarterly reviewer implied, when science affirms specific forms of life to be medically less alive already, it helps to render their deaths less reprehensible-a logic familiar to twenty-first-century readers from its realization in fascist thanatopolitics. 48 Without defaming the whole diverse history of philosophical and medical vitalisms, there is ethical value to noticing, within romantic-era writing, an under-recognized pattern of dissent from the vitalist and organicist view, which Goethe, Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, and Shelley, for instance, each criticize for ''absolutism.'' 49 At issue is the possibility of thinking ''life'' in ways that are less prone to cast those presently deficient in power as deficient in life; that keep open the possibility that the logic of life (biology) bears important relationships to ''inorganic,'' physical, textual, and historical processes; and that do not ''disdai[n]'' the vulnerable, transient body as a ''Stain'' upon transcendent ''spirit'' (a position that ''Rousseau'' expresses in the poem [205, 201] ). Indeed, vitalist rhetoric has a way of celebrating ''Life'' as dissociable from, and triumphing over, its particular mortal embodiments, over ''lives.'' To speak of a power ''hurrying from life to life, yes, even through annihilation to life'' is to make each ''life'' seem dispensable. 50 Despite the personal connections Shelley and Lawrence shared, and despite their like tarnishing, by mutual adversaries, as ''materialists,'' The Triumph of Life takes a hard view on the version of life exemplified in Lawrence's Lectures. Indeed, the poem depicts triumphal life, the vision of vitalism, as another damaging episode in a long history of triumphal processions: like ''some conqueror's advance,'' life's ''triumphal pageant'' consists of vaunting ''Conqueror,'' renowned and recognizable ''mighty captives,'' anonymous prisoners, and a ''ribald crowd'' (112, 118, 129, 135, 136) . That ''Life'' here triumphs over various and sundry prior triumphalists, reducing them to ''spoilers spoiled,'' is the hollowest kind of victory (235). As Wang decisively proved, what the poem laments is the disturbing persistence of triumphal form in revolutionary and imperial rhetoric alike. 51 The poem's interlocutors repeatedly fret the question of whether the speaker can ''forbear / To join'' the ''sad pageantry,'' whether he must ''from spectator turn / Actor or victim in this wretchedness'' (188-89, 176, 305-6). But ''forbear'' can mean either to abstain or to tolerate, and, thanks to the particular logic of parades that makes the ''spectator'' constitutive of the event, the speaker's dilemma around whether to ''join'' is exposed as an empty choice. By the light of the poem's first visions, then, Shelley suggests that the vitalist approach to life at present-a Regency and Restoration present in which British and French monarchies had absorbed the most promising democratic shocks-risks complicity in ''The progress of the pageant''(193) that Walter Benjamin would later call the ''triumphal procession'' (Triumphzug) of victors' history. 52 As Rei Terada has argued, the most disconcerting feature of post-Waterloo historical experience for radicals may have been the growing perception that it was no longer ''even possible to tell revolution and restoration apart.'' 53 Could there be a less triumphal manner of understanding and representing the epochal and, Shelley suggests, interlinked problems ''of Life'' and of ''the times that were / And scarce have ceased to be'' (233-34)?
The Triumph of Life goes on to counter the vitalist celebration of new, powerful, autonomous, teleological, self-organized life with a vision of life as a flagrantly disorganized and disorganizing effect: an obsolescent and transitive expression between bodies that multiplies their relations and exacerbates their contingency. Here ''women foully disarrayed / Shake their grey hair in the insulting wind'' (165-66). To read The Triumph of Life as contravening vitalism for the sake of life, or better, for the sake of ''those who live,'' begins to redress a symptomatic asymmetry in the poem's critical reception. 54 On the one hand, as we have seen, Shelley's poem is a privileged test case for deconstructive readings; on the other, the only one of Shelley's poems to have ''Life'' in its title has received curiously little attention within the recent outpouring of scholarship on the romantic life sciences. 55 This is because, viewed from within the frame of vitalist organicism, The Triumph of Life seems to have nothing to say about life: as Gigante observes from this perspective, ''Rousseau'' in the poem ''may speak the word Life, but . . . he appears not to know what it means.'' 56 Not quite: Shelley's characters are dissenting from what much of mainstream literary-scientific culture says it means. The poem is therefore preoccupied with vitalism's constitutive exclusions, which are not incidentally deconstruction's watchwords: the inorganic, the material, the mechanical, and the dead. 57 And it shows that these terms are not necessarily anathema to ''life'' otherwise conceived.
It will be through, not despite, its formal and thematic interest in death and the special strain of anachronistic materialism that Shelley's poem participates in the cultural debate about living form, and not just its violent negation via the materiality of the letter. Like Goethe's Morphology in the late teens, it finds Lucretius's prebiological materialism useful for asking after the forms and features of natural and cultural life that would become unrepresentable (1) under the aegis of a science of life defined ''absolutely'' against the laws and logics of nonliving entities and processes, and (2) as a consequence of poetry's marginalization from the field of natural scientific representation. 58 Shelley's invocation of Lucretian poetic atomism, in its untimely ignorance of the polemical uniqueness of modern ''life,'' as of modern ''literature,'' has the force of a cultural counterweight, keeping the science of the living in contact with other kinds of composed and decomposing forms. 59 For Shelley's poem next draws us thoroughly outside the vitalist frame, summoning readers to an ancient materialist philosophy that accounted for life without implementing an ontological distinction between the living and other beings, without investing the matter of their bodies with an immaterial ''superadded'' principle, and even without understanding that matter as distinguished from other kinds by an immanent power or property. Atoms and void, De rerum natura insists, are the universe's sole components, and they are not alive. Nor is nature in its totality. Life, self, and sentience issue as second-order effects of the atoms' intricate, accidental concrescencesand they are lost completely at death, when the component pieces disperse and persons, as Shelley's poem puts it, ''die in rain'' (157). 60 Turning to Lucretius to roll back the agon between organic and inorganic being, Shelley next positions material susceptibility to influence, to decay, and to morphological transfiguration-as central, rather than inimical, to life. The last part of The Triumph of Life turns the organicist focus on ''unity . . . produced ab intra'' inside out, focusing instead the animating effects of the ''living air'' between beings. 61 
A Thousand Unimagined Shapes
As intimated earlier, in the poem's last scene ''a thousand unimagined shapes'' dim the totalizing glare of the previous ''shape all light.'' Their ''busy'' activity obscures the grim procession of History writ large and makes visible, instead, a surrounding storm of minute and nonlinear relations: a nontriumphal form of liveliness at work in the interstices of imperial pageantry. Turning away from the famous subjects of the prior visions, this revisionary ''new Vision'' takes as its subject the medium through which we have been watching the spectacle of ''Life'' all along. The air through which subjects move and see proves rife with spectral and equivocal being: a ''living storm'' rife with cast-off matter and errant particles worked into ''busy phantoms'' by the sunlight (466, 534). 62 Reporting from the poem's new immersive perspective, a perspective ''plunged'' within ''the thickest billows of the living storm,'' ''Rousseau'' describes ''The earth'' as ''grey with phantoms,'' and ''the air'' as ''peopled with dim forms'' (467, 466, 482-83). He then explains at length his gradual realization that the whole dense atmosphere in which he is immersed is a weather system of discarded faces, cast-off ''masks'' that erode the distinction between physical and rhetorical figures: ''As the sun shapes the clouds-thus, on the way Mask after mask fell from the countenance And form of all. . . . '' Plunging ''Rousseau'' into the ''living storm,'' the poem has plunged readers into book 4 of De rerum natura (Shelley's favorite, as he once wrote a friend). 63 Here Lucretius claims that all things, as they decay in time, scatter fine atomic husks from the surfaces of their bodies. Like a snake's discarded skin, these airborne exfoliations preserve the ''form and figure [et formai servare figuram]'' of the body from which they were shed; they ''flit about hither and thither through the air,'' transporting atom-thin likenesses of bodies across the distances between them (4.69, 32). As Thomas Creech's popular English translation of De rerum natura had it:
A STREAM of FORMS from ev'ry SURFACE flows, Which may be call'd the FILM or SHELL of THOSE: Because they bear the SHAPE, they show the FRAME, And FIGURE of the BODIES whence they came 64 Sentient beings perceive other bodies by means of these extravagant films, whose touch occasions sensation and thought when they impinge upon a susceptible organ. Exceedingly slight, these ''semblances and tenuous figures [effigias tenuisque figuras]'' (4.42) are amenable to dissolution and recombination-''Each, like himself and like each other were, / At first, but soon distorted seem to be,'' as Shelley has it; coalescing or expanding, they join the clouds that form our atmosphere-''Obscure clouds moulded by the casual air.'' Perhaps most critically for their Shelleyan adaptation, Lucretian figurae ''wander'' long distance and long term, texturing any perceived present with shades of distant and prior happenings: ''the spent vision of the times that were / And scarce have ceased to be'' (233-34).
Lucretius calls these shapes by names that belong as much to rhetoric as to physics and, in most philosophies, connote no physical being at all: simulacra, figurae, imagines. Offering no separate ontology for the verbal figurae that occur in his poem, the physical ones (perplexis figuris) that are the objects of his science, and the tenuous ones (tenuisque figuras) that transfer those objects into his senses, neither the physics nor the poetry of De rerum natura enforces a distinction in kind between physical, phenomenal, and rhetorical shapes. Here figures are fractions of the real estranged from their sources, and all bodies, not just verbal ones, are granted the capacity, indeed the necessity, of producing them. Beings transpire into tropes, because to have a physical figure, a body compounded of parts, is to emit figures as those parts fall away. 65 Shelley's poem points us, then, toward materialist figuration as a mode of decadent (down-falling) and extravagant (outward-wandering) transfer: a process by which corporeal beings produce an order of sensible experience that is coextensive with their transience, an order no less real, material, or consequential for being figural and transitory. By Lucretian lights we can read the ''thousand unimagined shapes'' of Shelley's ''new Vision'' in a different sense. Such shapes may be ''unimagined'' because they are, tenuously, exogenously real. The possibility goes some way to account for an observation that recurs in the most sensitive assessments of Shelleyan figuration from the early nineteenth century to the present: that it has a peculiar pretense at substance, at being ''something more'' than metaphor. Shelley, wrote Hazlitt, paints ''pictures on gauze . . . and then proceeds to prove their truth by describing them in detail as matters of fact''; Walter Benjamin wrote of Shelley's particular ''grip [Griff]'' on allegory. 66 William Keach traced the disorienting effects of Shelleyan language to a penchant for ''reversed or inverted simile,'' which uses ''mental'' vehicles to express ''physical'' tones. 67 James Chandler concludes that Shelley's figures for history never stand for ''merely an affair of 'consciousness,' the immaterial internality of a material externality,'' and, according to Alan Bewell, when Shelley figures imperial power as an atmospheric pestilence, he is going ''beyond metaphor'' to claim that all climates are climates of power. 68 For eighteenth-and nineteenth-century readers receptive to the possibility, De rerum natura's model of poetic materialism offered something more than the didactic aspiration to educate and delight, despite the modest ''honeyed cup'' topos by which Lucretius claims to be coating harsh philosophical contents in palatably sweet poetic form. In its philosophy and poetry, De rerum natura exemplified the mutual implication of poetry and empirical knowledge in processes of figuration that are the object, means, and medium of any scientific investigation of nature. That is, it offered license to resist the long epistemic transformation that would make prose the presumptive medium for communicating social and natural realities and secure poetry its enduring place at the prestigious margins of cultural life-as a discourse expert in the immaterial reaches of human subjectivity, or the special materiality of language itself. 69 As we have seen, in The Triumph's last neo-Lucretian vision, being a body in time means shedding atoms of self-involuntarily re-presenting oneselfand weathering others' particulate bombardment: ''Bending within each other's atmosphere,'' as Shelley puts it in the poem (151). Beings decay into perception, experiencing each other by means of an incessant exchange of similitudes that is neither willed, nor linguistic, nor without physical cost. We can say, with de Man, that ''Rousseau'' is telling the story of a distinctly prosopopoetic demise and that bodies indeed are disfigured in the course Growing Old Together: Lucretian Materialism in Shelley's ''Poetry of Life'' of all this figuration-but gradually, slightly, even gently. The resultant changes of face mark less the special, violent interruption of figuration, cognition, and relation by an alien materiality (''actual events,'' the ''madness of words'') than the routine material condition of appearing at all. In Shelley's neo-Lucretian mode, figuration and mortality nontraumatically coincide: the ''new Vision'' of ''Rousseau'' in the poem is about giving each other wrinkles, weathering the innumerable touches of each other's ''busy''-ness. 70 ''Rousseau'' likens the impact of the vision's airborne simulacra to dingy, somewhat enervating snowflakes:
''And others like discoloured flakes of snow On fairest bosoms and the sunniest hair Fell, and were melted by the youthful glow ''Which they extinguished. . . . '' In this meeting between phantom-flake and living skin a mist is produced, a rain that seems perspiration, precipitation, and passion all at once. ''For like tears'' the phantoms ''were / A veil to those from whose faint lids they rained / In drops of sorrow'' (514-16). We are here confronted with the disconcerting reality of material figures: at first like weather (snowflakes) and like tears (drops of sorrow), the phantoms ultimately lose the hesitation of simile and erode the distinction between personal psychic sorrow and collective atmosphere. ''They'' simply ''rained / In drops of sorrow'' from ''faint lids,'' lids whose owners might have been weeping, or simply rained upon. 71 It is important, though, that these sorrow drops are not strictly-or not exclusivelytheirs. Well-traveled simulacra wet eyes, condition seeing, and reshape faces in this area of the poem, as bodies participate in an unchosen collectivity of decay and transfiguration. 72 Nor is it all so weepy. The busy phantoms perform a remarkable variety of corrosive activities in the poem: flinging, flying, dancing, chattering, playing, nesting, thronging, and laughing, too, between the bodies that prolifically lose and loose them (487-510).
The poem's last vision in no way denies the worry over historical complicity that marks the earlier modes of viewing in The Triumph of Life, but rather furiously multiplies it to the point where one's personal selfhood and its drama of choosing comes undone: ''I among the multitude / Was swept,'' recalls ''Rousseau,'' Reciting ''me . . . not,'' ''Me not,'' ''Me not,'' ''Me, not,'' the lines rhythmically subdue this author's iconic, prolific, autobiographical subjectivity. Whereas ''Rousseau'' had emerged in the poem's first vision to lament his decay as a ''Stain'' upon ''that within which still disdains to wear it'' (205, emphasis added), this final vision chooses to tell the history of the stain over that of the personal ''Rousseau.'' The poem's repeated autobiographical demand, ''Shew whence I came, and where I am, and why-,'' is answered, finally, with a history of ''whence those forms proceeded which thus stained / The track in which we moved'' (398, 517-18, emphasis added). The ensuing vision of life depicts selves as steeped in a staining kind of atmosphere that, as we have seen, both animates and decimates. Persons ''Kindle invisibly'' and are gradually ''extinguished'' under the impact of the climate they collectively generate and endure (152, 514). 73 
Equivocity / What Shares the Air
Nor would this account of mixed and seething air have seemed ''merely'' metaphorical in 1822. Adam Walker, the popular scientific lecturer who taught Shelley natural philosophy at Syon House and later at Eton, described the atmosphere as ''a grand receiver, in which all the attenuated and volatilized productions of terrestrial bodies are contained, mingled, agitated, combined, and separated.'' His lecture went on to list the sheer diversity of ''attenuated and volatilized'' particles in which the turn-ofthe-nineteenth-century body was bathed: ''mineral vapours, animal and vegetable moleculae, seeds, [and] eggs,'' all ''dissolved in light.'' Such air, Walker taught, does not stay safely outside a body, but is ''so subtil that it pervades the pores of all bodies and enters into [their] composition.'' 74 The English air, moreover, as Mary Favret has shown, was increasingly bearing currents from farther and farther afield, as meteorology changed from a study of local exhalations to ''a global system of communication.'' 75 The Triumph of Life ends by challenging us to take up the position of that laden, interpersonal, and impersonal air. From the perspective of this atmosphere (''living storm,'' ''casual air,'' ''stain''), the triumphal pageant that has been the object of each successive vision looks quite different. Powerful actors are still visible in this latest version of the procession: ''pontiffs'' (497), kings, and ''lawyer, statesman, priest and theorist'' (510)-but none of them has a recognizable face. 76 For the busy phantoms that make up the ''living storm,'' the bodies of monarchs are nothing more, or less, than habitat: some ''played / Within the crown which girt with empire // A baby's or an idiot's brow, and made / Their nests in it'' (497-500). In this way the switch to Lucretian figural materialism has enabled Shelley to depict a nontriumphal Growing Old Together: Lucretian Materialism in Shelley's ''Poetry of Life'' form of liveliness mixed in with life's imperial show: the ''old anatomies'' of kings are inadvertently ''hatching . . . base broods'' (501) that will ultimately ''reassume the[ir] delegated power'' (503).
As the poem takes up a view, as through a microscope, that reveals how the cast-off ''atomies'' of subjects are transformed into new ''busy phantoms'' that ''nest'' in the bodies of sensible size, Shelley takes care to provide all the requisite topoi from the ongoing debate concerning ''spontaneous'' or ''equivocal'' generation: warmth, moisture, dead matter and new, ''busy,'' ''unimagined shapes.'' The doctrine of equivocal generation (for which De rerum natura was the preeminent locus classicus) held that living beings could emerge, without parents, without seeds, and without intercourse, from ''mere brute matter'' (abiogenesis) or from once living ''organic particles'' of a different species (heterogenesis). As Erasmus Darwin put it in The Temple of Nature (1803), ''without parent by spontaneous birth / Rise the first specks of animated earth; / From Nature's womb the plant or insect swims, / And buds or breathes, with microscopic limbs.'' 77 Opponents (here, Joseph Priestley refuting Erasmus Darwin) derided the doctrine as a cause-effect violation: ''nothing less than the production of an effect without any adequate cause.'' ''-and pointedly continuous with accident and decay. Like the atoms of Lucretian poetic science, these materials' ontological status is not inherent, but rather dependent on the congeries into which they chance: some configurations are vital (''like small gnats''), material (''like discoloured flakes of snow''), and textual (''numerous as the dead leaves blown,'' a borrowed epic simile). They equivocate between familiar (''flies'') and strange (''vampire bats''); between dying and living (''phantoms''); between the discourses of poetry, biology, and history.
The poem stays studiously agnostic about this vital, material, and figurative swarm, whose chancy productivity is a far cry from an optimistic faith in the future progress of ''Life'' or history in their madcap career. Its promise is emphatically, technically minimal: the last vision describes-without laying a hope upon-the atom-thin margin by which the present deviates from itself, offering only the hard consolation that material processes (history, life) must trope rather than repeat themselves.
In fact, one effect of the alternative model of figuration at work in this part of the poem is to revise Shelley's lead metaphor for the oppressed ''Men of England'' put forward in The Mask of Anarchy of 1819. ''Nurslings of one mighty Mother,'' he had hailed them in that poem, ''Rise like Lions after slumber.'' 79 Under the impact of the ''drops of sorrow'' we have been tracking, the leonine image returns with a vengeance but from a perspective of uncompensated bereavement rather than redemption:
'' . . . the marble brow of youth was cleft
With care, and in the eyes where once hope shone Desire like a lioness bereft ''Of its last cub, glared ere it died; . . . '' The lines reveal the kind of prosopopeia of which ''a great crowd'' is inadvertently capable: their attenuated ''thousand'' touches amount to something that resembles an artist's deliberate labor, as the enjambed phrase ''was cleft / With care'' turns the head-splitting violence of cleft into a scene of careful craft (the poet's careful cleaving of lines, or a sculptor's work on marble); or rather, suggests that the accidental impact of others' airborne ''care[s]'' amounts to the same thing. Next transfiguring the blow of ''cleft'' into a worry line, the prosopopeia delivers a subverted Pygmalion myth in miniature: only in creasing under the weight of care does the marble brow transform from stone to skin in these lines, sensible now as the mobile forehead of a living face. The conflicting senses of cleaving here-holding together or dashing apart-capture the dual aspect of Lucretian transience as the loss or waning of one's ''own'' materials under the sculpting pressure of others' contact. 80 Against the passage's predictable lament for beauty lost, then, and in concert with Shelley's neo-Lucretian experiment, this kind of prosopopoetic animation makes its marble Galatea age into life. Moreover, aging coincides with the increase of a different form of political desire in the passage, as something animal, maternal, and aggrieved takes over ''in the eyes.'' In The Triumph we are eventually seeing by the light of this fierce maternal glare, also called ''the glare / Of the tropic sun'' (484-85). Fusing personal senescence and imperial politics, proximate and distant, this transfigured face issues a demand the poem leaves unmet, a ''desire'' for redress that outlasts the ''hope'' of its arrival (525, 524). 81 
Historical Material
Choosing ''phantom'' as the lead term for figural-material simulacra in the vision, Shelley emphasizes the belatedness that adheres in Lucretius's account of sensuous perception. For in De rerum natura, as we have seen, any sensation participates literally, particulately, in the obsolescent reality of whose expenditure it is the sign. Sight is ''the spent vision of times that were / And scarce have ceased to be'' (233-34), in Shelley's words which afford even to nearby things the attenuated temporality of stargazing. And The Triumph stresses that what Shelley calls a ''mutual atmosphere'' brings a body into contact not only with figures shed from nearby persons and things but also with aged particles and long-traveled images. 82 Filling up the interstices between bodies separated in space and time, the poem's atmosphere constitutes a subtle but real medium of ''attenuated and volatilized'' interinfluence that eludes conscious grasp and linear causality. We are concerned here with what Kevis Goodman, following Raymond Williams, has theorized as ''social experience 'in solution,''' an ''immanent, collective perception of any moment as a seething mix of unsettled elements,'' and with the retroactive fitness of Lucretian poetic physics as an ontology and lexicon for describing this kind of romantic historical experience. 83 Lucretian materialism helps articulate ''unapprehended relations'' between events both too big to grasp and too small to notice: the medium in which the figure of a distant person's sorrow might strike impalpably, like a snowflake, and in which the diffused image of Napoléon in chains might subtly reshape a particular face-''I felt my cheek / Alter to see the great form pass away'' (224-25).
In his attempt, in the theses On the Concept of History, to delineate a historical materialist practice that could resist the triumphalism of present progress narratives, Walter Benjamin also wondered if the belated business of the departed does not touch us in air: Doesn't a breath of the air that pervaded earlier days caress us as well? In the voices we hear, isn't there an echo of now silent ones? Don't the women we court have sisters they no longer recognize? If so, then there is a secret agreement [Verabredung: date, rendezvous] between past generations and the present one. 84 [Streift denn nicht uns selber ein Hauch der Luft, die um die Frü heren gewesen ist? ist nicht in Stimmen, denen wir unser Ohr schenken, ein Echo von nun verstummten? haben die Frauen, die wir umwerben, nicht Schwestern, die sie nicht mehr gekannt haben? Ist dem so, dann besteht eine geheime Verabredung zwischen den gewesenen Geschlechtern und unserm.] 85 Benjamin's question is one, as Shelley might put it, of ''what stain[s] / The track in which we mov [e] .'' In fact, in this thesis, Benjamin links terrestrial happiness to the theses' messianic-materialist ''fight for the oppressed past'' by way of a stain or tinge, which share an etymology in tingere (Latin): our ''image of happiness [Bild von Glück],'' he writes, ''is thoroughly coloured [tingiert, tinged] by the time to which the course of our own existence has assigned us.'' 86 The same is true, he continues, for the ''idea of the past, which is the concern of history'' (II, 389-90 [693]).
At moments in these theses, the historical materialist's capacity to represent something other than ''homogeneous, empty time,'' is described in the language of vital power: not ''drained by the whore called 'Once upon a time,''' for instance, ''He remains in control of his powers-man enough to blast open the continuum of history'' (XVII, XVI, 396 [702] ). But through the second thesis's questions, which move from the thought of air that will have touched both past and present beings, to the citation of the past in present speech, to unacknowledged or unapprehended (familial) relations, Benjamin arrives at the notion of ''weak messianic power'' (II, 390
[694]). Here ''power,'' it turns out, sounds more like a slight susceptibility, a mundane being claimed or spoken for that has less to do with the perspective of angels for which the theses are famous than with the fact of having had expectant parents:
Then our coming was expected on earth. Then, like every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed with a weak messianic power, a power on which the past has a claim. Such a claim cannot be settled cheaply. In this thesis, then, the overlapping time of terrestrial generations and their (missed) happiness are aligned with the historical materialist's antiteleological, constructivist, and constellating intuition, and against progressive historicism's triumphal procession of victors' history. 87 In an early iteration of the argument that poetry does best to negate contact with its age, J. S. Mill argued, closer to Shelley's own time, that poetry cannot be ''tinged'' with ''lookings forth into the outward and every day,'' lest it ''ceases to be poetry, and becomes eloquence.'' 88 But a poetics of the weakly messianic tinge is precisely what The Triumph seeks as it attempts to rethink embodied life, nontriumphantly, as transience ''into the outward and everyday.'' Indeed, life here becomes a decadently transitive figurea touch, a tinge, a stain-between those who inhabit a particular present, and between those who are present and those who are coming.
Lucretian poetics are also, quite specifically, a poetics of the eloquent tinge and touch. Abbreviating these poetics into the topos of the ''honey'd cup''-Lucretius's verse is the ''sweet honey'' that makes the bitter medicine of Epicurean physics palatable-we lose the fact that the poet's work, the poet's verb, is not to sweeten, but to touch together, to tinge, the action of . And to describe poiesis as contingent in this way actually fortifies its reality: after all, in De rerum natura, reality only ever occurs because, amid the rain of first particles falling in parallel, two come into contact, initiating, ''from encounter to encounter, a pile-up and the birth of a world.'' 89 Shelley's poem on life seeks out this touched, tinged, contingent matter as equipped to bring the discourses of history, life, and poetry into nontriumphal and timely contact.
The poem pictures ''Life'' as wrinkled by these serial touches, as ''a Shape / . . . whom years deform,'' and who is now legible not as a negative allegory for embodied life but as a sustained experiment in the epistemology of aging, in positioning contingency and decay as constitutive of, rather than inimical to, life and its science (87) (88) . This figure of wrinkled life in the poem has a curious ''Charioteer'': a four-faced ''Janus,'' Roman God of beginnings and endings, with banded eyes. Clearly, this driver is no formative Bildungstrieb teleologically ensuring life's progressive development. This blind figure drives by touch instead, keeping life's course contingent upon the pressure of its historical atmosphere. 
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